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Abstract:  Tensions between the domain of reason and the domain of faith have been one 
of the most controversial issues in the history of our civilization for over three hundred 
years.  They have contributed to many divisions, conflicts, and even wars.  Contributions 
that have sought to reconcile the two domains have largely used the cultural approach in 
trying to solve this problem.  The approach used in this essay views faith and reason from 
the perspective of cognitive operations.  It shows that viewed from this perspective, faith 
and reason emerge as two aspects of the process of creation of new levels of organization 
that takes place in the human mind.  The essay correlates faith and reason with such 
cognitive operations as equilibration and the production of disequilibrium.  This approach 
shows that there is no fundamental ontological contradiction between faith and reason, 
and that cooperation between them is not only possible but actually essential for 
sustaining our mental work and the survival of our civilization. 
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Introduction 
 
Tensions between the domain of reason and the domain of faith have been one of the 
most controversial problems in the history of our civilization for over more than three 
hundred years.  The rise of Modernity with its emphasis of rational thought and science 
challenged the domination of the Church.  It led to the rivalry that is as alive today as it 
was three centuries ago.  Battles between advocates of reason and the adepts of faith have 
been coming and going.  They involved politicians and public figures, church dignitaries 
and government officials, scientists and theologians, elites and common people.  These 
battles raged in the public arena and around dinner tables.  There has been hardly another 
issue in the history of our civilization that has attracted as much attention at the 
relationship between faith and reason.  
 
Numerous voices in the past have called for reconciliation of reason and faith.  They see 
faith and religion as two most important domains in our cultural heritage.  These voices 
have argued that such reconciliation will bring enormous benefits both for public and 
intellectual life and will help resolve many problems faced by our civilization.  Mutual 
cooperative and complementary relations between faith and reason, they have 
maintained, will help heal many social and political divisions and remove obstacles to 
progress in science, technology, the moral fabric of our society, our aesthetic sensibilities, 
and in many other areas.  Although the call for reconciliation is compelling, the prospects 
for reconciliation remain uncertain and the peace is nowhere in sight. 
 
 2 
Those who have been and are involved in the debates largely view faith and reason as 
cultural phenomena, which they certainly are.1  However, faith and reason also relate 
another area—the area of cognition and cognitive operations performed by human mind.  
Although there have been thinkers who have heeded this approach (need sources) their 
number is much smaller and is largely lost in the clamor of culture wars.  This essay will 
use both approaches.  Although certainly aware of the much louder contest in the cultural 
sphere, it sees important possibilities in using a cognitive approach.  After a brief 
overview of the proposed solutions with culture in their main focus, the essay will take a 
cognitive path by establishing correlations between faith and reason, on one hand, and 
cognitive operations on the other.  It is in this area that the essay will seek the resolution 
of the problem of reconciling faith and reason. 
 
 
Reason and Faith:  In Search for Reconciliation 
 
There is no shortage of ideas on reconciling faith and reason.  Patrick Quigly, for 
example, lists five main approaches toward reconciliation.2  These approaches range from 
one extreme to another—from views that advocate subordination of faith to reason or 
vice versa, to views that advocate their equal but separate existence.  The proposals for 
subordination come both from the domain of faith and the domain of reason.  Examples 
of the former include such figures as Jerry Falwell, Robert Grant, and Pat Robertson.3  At 
the other extreme of the specter we find the likes of Richard Dawkins, the enfant terrible 
of new atheism, Steven Weinberg, and others who ardently proclaims the superiority of 
scientific reason and on principle oppose any attempts even at reconciliation, to say 
nothing of unification.4  A rhetorical question from Mano Singham conveys the attitude 
of many who subscribe to new atheism:  “After all, if we concede without argument that 
mainstream religious beliefs are compatible with science, how can we argue that 
witchcraft and astrology are not?”5 
 
The supporters of reconciliation include some of the most visible scientific and religious 
institutions, as well as prominent scientists and church leaders.  Among the religious 
institutions supporting cooperation are the Catholic Church, the General Assembly of the 
Presbyterian Church, and the Central Conference of American Rabbis to name just a few.  
Both Pope John Paul II and Pope Benedict XVI have been very passionate advocates of 
harmony between religion and science.6   
 
Supporters of cooperation from the domain of reason include such major organizations as 
National Academies of Sciences and a good number of eminent scientists, including 
some Nobel laureates.7  The National Academy of Sciences (NAS), for example, has 
urged accommodation in one of its most authoritative statements on the subject of 
evolution and creationism.  Alluding to radicals who consider scientific reason and faith 
to be totally incompatible, both on the religious and on the scientific side, the statement 
emphasizes:  “Attempts to pit science and religion against each other create controversy 
where none needs to exist.”8  Some of the most prestigious scientific publications, 
including magazines Nature and Science, have prominently featured articles by advocates 
of cooperation and reconciliation.  There are also numerous publications that seek 
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specifically to bring scientific reason and faith closer together, such as Zygon, Theology 
and Science, Science and Christian Belief, Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith, 
and others. 
 
The writings of Pope John Paul II and Pope Benedict XVI are certainly the most 
authoritative sources on the position of the Catholic Church.  According to this position, 
although reason and faith relate to different aspects of reality, they both come from the 
same source and are intimately connected to each other.  In a passage of his encyclical 
letter “Fides et Ratio,” that is informed as much by theology as by poetic imagination, 
John Paul II refers to faith and reason as “two wings on which the human spirit rises to 
the contemplation of God.”9  He also cites the First Vatican Council in support of his 
views: 
 
Even if faith is superior to reason there can never be a true divergence 
between faith and reason, since the same God who reveals the mysteries 
and bestows the gift of faith has also placed in the human spirit the light of 
reason.  This God could not deny himself, nor could the truth ever 
contradict the truth.10 
 
For Benedict XVI, faith and reason are also part of the same totality.  In his view, as John 
Allen points out, “Whatever the findings of the natural sciences, they will not contradict 
Christian faith, since ultimately the truth is one.”11 
 
While both John Paul II and Benedict XVI argue that faith and reason merely reflect 
different aspects of reality and in many ways complement each other, they emphasize that 
faith plays a unique and perhaps even primary role.  Faith, they maintain, opens for 
reason a possibility of new knowledge and even a possibility to know what reason on its 
own will never be able to understand fully.  In a passage discussing the mystery of Divine 
Revelation in his encyclical letter John Paul II writes: 
  
Revelation has set within history a point of reference which cannot be 
ignored if the mystery of human life is to be known. Yet this knowledge 
refers back constantly to the mystery of God which the human mind 
cannot exhaust but can only receive and embrace in faith. Between these 
two poles, reason has its own specific field in which it can enquire and 
understand, restricted only by its finiteness before the infinite mystery of 
God.12 
 
Elsewhere Pope John Paul II asserts:  “Faith alone makes it possible to penetrate the 
mystery in a way that allows us to understand it coherently . . . the world and the events 
of history cannot be understood in depth without professing faith in the God who is at 
work in them.13 
 
Pope Benedict XVI has also expressed on numerous occasions his concern over what he 
sees as a trend in the contemporary culture to disregard the insights of religious thought 
and rely excessively on reason.  This trend, in his opinion, severely limits the human 
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capacity to know and is responsible for many problems that plague the contemporary 
civilization.  In his address delivered at the University of Regensburg in 2006, Benedict 
XVI offers the following reflection: 
 
Modern scientific reason quite simply has to accept the rational structure 
of matter and the correspondence between our spirit and the prevailing 
rational structures of nature as a given, on which its methodology has to be 
based. Yet the question why this has to be so is a real question, and one 
which has to be remanded by the natural sciences to other modes and 
planes of thought—to philosophy and theology. For philosophy and, albeit 
in a different way, for theology, listening to the great experiences and 
insights of the religious traditions of humanity, and those of the Christian 
faith in particular, is a source of knowledge, and to ignore it would be an 
unacceptable restriction of our listening and responding. Here I am 
reminded of something Socrates said to Phaedo. In their earlier 
conversations, many false philosophical opinions had been raised, and so 
Socrates says: “It would be easily understandable if someone became so 
annoyed at all these false notions that for the rest of his life he despised 
and mocked all talk about being—but in this way he would be deprived of 
the truth of existence and would suffer a great loss.”14 
 
These statements show that while recognizing that faith and reason complement each 
other, the Catholic position is that faith plays a unique, special, and perhaps even primary 
role since it allows an infinite expansion of human knowledge.  The distinct feature of the 
Judeo-Christian tradition is its transcendent deity that possesses the power of divine 
creation.  This tradition opens the path to knowing the unknown and grasping the mystery 
of creation.  Scientific reason lacks these insights and has so far been refusing to deal 
with such issues as miracle and creation.  As John Paul II put it: 
 
We may say, then, that Israel, with her reflection, was able to open to 
reason the path that leads to the mystery. With the Revelation of God 
Israel could plumb the depths of all that she sought in vain to reach by 
way of reason.15 
 
There are few comparable authoritative voices that come from the domain of 
secular reason that would advocate the development of a worldview that fully 
embraces reason and faith as mutually informing each other.  The position on the 
relationship between reason and faith of the overwhelming majority of the 
proponents of secular rationality advocates the so-called nonoverlapping 
magisteria, or NOMA.  This position owes a great deal to the late Stephen Jay 
Gould who has articulated and popularized its main precepts.  Central to Gould’s 
view is what he sees as the fundamental difference in the role of faith and reason 
in knowledge production.  While reason relies on rational deductions and tangible 
facts (experimental evidence and observations), faith and religion focus on things 
that are intangible (values, beliefs, and meanings) and even supernatural.  In other 
words, reason and faith belong to different domains, or what Gould termed 
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“magisteria” (from “magister,” or teacher).  Their respective magisteria do not 
overlap (hence NOMA, or nonoverlapping magisteria) and, therefore, there is no 
ground for conflict between reason and faith.  In his article “Nonoverlapping 
Magisteria” Gould writes: 
 
Consideration of the method used in the various branches of knowledge 
makes it possible to reconcile two points of view which would seem 
irreconcilable . . . No such conflict should exist because each subject has a 
legitimate magisterium, or domain of teaching authority--and these 
magisteria do not overlap (the principle that I would like to designate as 
NOMA, or "nonoverlapping magisteria"). The net of science covers the 
empirical universe: what is it made of (fact) and why does it work this way 
(theory) The net of religion extends over questions of moral meaning and 
value. These two magisteria do not overlap, nor do they encompass all 
inquiry (consider, for, starters, the magisterium of art and the meaning of 
beauty).16 
 
Gould suggests that a comprehensive understanding of reality should involve 
proficiency in both domains: 
 
The lack of conflict between science and religion arises from a lack of 
overlap between their respective domains of professional expertise--
science in the empirical constitution of the universe, and religion in the 
search for proper ethical values and the spiritual meaning of our lives. The 
attainment of wisdom in a full life requires extensive attention to both 
domains--for a great book tells us that the truth can make us free and that 
we will live in optimal harmony with our fellows when we learn to do 
justly, love mercy, and walk humbly.17 
 
In a passage charged with emotion and hope, Gould opines:  “I believe, with all 
my heart, in a respectful, even loving concordat between our magisteria--the 
NOMA solution.”18 
 
Since Gould’s formulation, NOMA has come to express “’the consensus of a great 
majority of professional scientists’ and is quite popular among certain philosophers of 
science as well.”19  A statement from NAS reasserts Gould’s concept of nonoverlapping 
magisteria: 
 
Science and religion are based on different aspects of human experience.  
In science, explanations must be based on evidence drawn from examining 
the natural world. Scientifically based observations or experiments that 
conflict with an explanation eventually must lead to modification or even 
abandonment of that explanation. Religious faith, in contrast, does not 
depend only on empirical evidence, is not necessarily modified in the face 
of conflicting evidence, and typically involves supernatural forces or 
entities. Because they are not a part of nature, supernatural entities cannot 
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be investigated by science.  In this sense, science and religion are separate 
and address aspects of human understanding in different ways. Attempts 
to pit science and religion against each other create controversy where 
none needs to exist.20 
 
And just like Gould, NAS affirms that “Science is not the only way of knowing and 
understanding” but merely a way of knowing based on “empirical evidence and testable 
explanations.”21  It even suggests the equality of faith and reason as “different ways of 
understanding” and chastises the opponents of this concordat for reducing “the potential 
of both to contribute to a better future.”22  This statement issued in 2008 goes quite a bit 
further that the earlier one in 1999 that merely claimed that faith and reason “occupy two 
separate realms of human experience” and warned that a demand “that they be combined 
detracts from the glory of each.”23 
 
Many prominent individual scientists and secular philosophers have spoken and continue 
to speak in support of NOMA.  This support is particularly strong among those scientists 
who profess their commitment to Christian faith.  They include such recognized 
authorities in the field of sciences as biologist Francisco Ayala, recipient of 2001 
National Medal Of Science and 2010 Templeton Prize, physicist John Polkinghorne, a 
recipient of the Templeton Prize Francis Collins, director of the Human Genome Project 
and the National Human Genome Research Institute at the National Institute of Health, 
Father George Coyne, Catholic priest and a former director of the Vatican Observatory, 
and many others. 
 
There certainly has certainly been a sizable opposition that has challenged NOMA.  The 
opponents of cooperation between reason and faith constitute a very diverse group.  It 
includes many prominent scientists, such as Steven Weinberg and Richard Dawkins, as 
well as prominent religious leaders and groups, chief among them are New Earth, 
Intelligent Design, and Creationists.  Representatives of this group argue that 
perspectives on reality provided by science and religion do not have equal validity; rather 
one is superior to the other.  As has already been mentioned above, critics of cooperation 
from the domain of reason such as Steven Weinberg, Richard Dawkins, and others have 
attacked NOMA and other approaches focused on cooperation and accused them of a 
sell-out. 24 
 
The NOMA approach has not proven to be a lasting one.  Under intense questioning the 
main premise of nonoverlapping magisteria—the existence of two separate and largely 
incommensurate domains of faith and reason—has turned out for many to be untenable 
from both theoretical and practical point of view.  As a result, many who at one time 
supported the principle of equal but separate as a solution for the relationship between 
faith and reason shifted their focus away from NOMA in search of a new model.  
Proposals that are currently in circulation range from the need for an interactive dialogue 
to various degrees of integration of faith and reason and the development of a worldview 
that would be fully scientific and theologically sound—one in which faith and reason 
would mutually inform each other.25  However, despite their efforts, the attainment of the 
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resolution of this problem—i.e., creating fully cooperative and equal relations between 
faith and reason—remains elusive. 
 
Take, for example, Robert Pollack, a biologist and a believer, who tries to provide an 
answer to the question he uses as the title for his essay “Can Faith Broaden Reason?”26  
Although he tries to strike a balance between faith and reason, he still recognizes the 
impossibility of reasoning about creation, thus admitting that reason cannot achieve its 
principal goal of rendering reality intelligible in the case of creation.27  While one may 
agree with Pollack that faith is irrational, one cannot accept his suggestion that reason 
cannot render intelligible the irrational aspects of faith.  After all, Zigmund Freud has 
successfully used reason to analyze irrational drives and impulses. 
 
In the end, the solution that Pollack envisions is that reason and faith should mutually 
inform each other, although Pollack provides no rational understanding of how they 
should inform each other or what would be the end result of such process. 
 
He writes: 
 
In specifically Jewish terms, then, it is the God-given, inexplicable reality 
of free will that allows us to act well — or not.  That choice – available 
not just to Jews but to all people as their birthright – makes us all the 
active determiners of our fate. Pain, suffering, unreasonable 
maldistribution of good and bad fate: these are the very stuff of the natural 
world, the visible expression of the random genetic variation which 
provides natural selection with the eerie capacity to produce some living 
thing that will survive any contingency. It is my faith that informs me of 
my obligation as a scientist to use my own free will to work against these 
deepest mechanisms of the natural world, and thereby to work against the 
meaningless of these mechanisms.28 
 
 
Reconciling Faith and Reason 
 
 
Operational Equivalents of Faith and Reason in Mental Processes 
 
Faith and reason are both related to human thinking.  They represent, however, 
different types of mental operations that the human mind can perform.  Since they 
are both parts of what the human mind does, they must be related to each other.  
Therefore, understanding this relationship is essential for bringing them together 
as two specific cases of how the mind works. 
 
This essay is not the first attempt to understand biological and cognitive 
underpinnings of faith and reason.  This approach to the subject is still in the 
process of development.  Contributions of this nature range from serious and 
systematic to banal and even anecdotal, which are merely used to ridicule the 
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opposing side.29  An article by Wanting Zhong, et al, is a good example of trying 
to explore possible connections between faith and brain functions.30   
 
There are two ways in which we understand reason.  We often regard reason as 
the human mind and the sum total of its operations.  Such understanding 
represents the use of the word “reason” in a very general sense.  We also use the 
word “reason” in a functional sense, as specific operations that our mind can 
perform.  In this latter sense, we understand reason and reasoning as our capacity 
to make inferences that are logically valid—that is, inferences made in accordance 
with the rules and norms of human rational thinking.  In this sense, reasoning is 
the kind of mental operations that connect mental constructs with each other.  In 
this sense reason and reasoning represent a form of equilibration that balances 
various mental constructs with each other.  As such, reason is also about 
continuity. 
 
As a cognitive tool, faith is very different from reason.  It is decidedly not about 
logical connections between our mental constructs.  As mental constructs, objects 
of faith cannot be inferred from other mental constructs.  For this reason, we 
consider the source of faith and its objects to be illogical, intuitive, and irrational.  
In contrast to reason that is about continuity, faith has little to do with continuity 
of logical sequences; it is about disruption and radical discontinuity.  Also, if 
reason relates to establishing logical equilibrium, or equilibration, faith relates to 
disequilibrium, or the capacity of our mind to produce disequilibrium.  Thus, in 
the operational sense, one is perfectly justified to represent the problem of the 
relationship between faith and reason as the problem of the relationship between 
equilibrium and disequilibrium, or the relationship between equilibration and the 
production of disequilibrium. 
 
Determinism and Indeterminism in the Contemporary Conceptions of Reality 
  
Most contemporary thinkers see equilibrium and disequilibrium as two 
diametrical opposites.  They associate equilibrium with entropy, chaos, and 
disorder.  By contrast, they describe disequilibrium as an ordered state of a system 
that evolves in a certain direction.  In other words, they see the relationship 
between equilibrium and disequilibrium as the relationship between order and 
chaos or between determinism and indeterminism. 
 
There are two ways in which thinkers view reality today.  The dominant view is that 
ontologically reality is ultimately indeterminate, chaotic, and does not obey causal laws.  
This view serves as the foundation for quantum theory, thermodynamics, theory of 
biological evolution, and many others.   For example, according to quantum mechanics, 
the processes that occur at the most fundamental level of reality—that is, at the level of 
elementary particles and atoms—are random and do not obey the laws of causality.31  
The universe described by quantum mechanics appears to make absolutely no sense when 
viewed outside its formalism.  For example, how can one make sense of non-locality that 
involves speeds faster than the speed of light that is considered to be the absolute speed 
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attainable in nature?  What should one make of superposition that describes a quantum 
system that can be in two different states at the same time?  The contradictions with our 
familiar sense of how physical reality is are so great that even those who are intimately 
familiar with quantum theory find its puzzles hard to comprehend.  Richard Feynman, 
who received a Nobel Prize for his achievements in quantum mechanics, cautioned:   
 
Do not keep saying to yourself, if you can possible avoid it, “But how can it be 
like that?” because you will get 'down the drain,' into a blind alley from which 
nobody has yet escaped. Nobody knows how it can be like that.32 
 
Unsurprisingly, the view of quantum reality as random and uncertain sets limits to what 
we can know about it.  In a characteristic remark Stephen Hawking, one of the most 
authoritative voices in modern physics, summarizes the view to which many 
contemporary physicists would subscribe: 
 
I do not demand that a theory correspond to reality because I don’t know 
what it is. Reality is not a quality you can test with litmus paper.  All I 
am concerned with is that the theory should predict the results of 
measurements.  Quantum theory does this successfully.33 
 
The view of reality as random is not limited the processes that occur at the level of 
elementary particles, or the micro level.  Some physicists identify macro processes that 
display quantum phenomena.  For example, a group of Russian physicists led by S. 
Korotaev has described phenomena of non-locality that occur in geomagnetic 
correlations.34   Many biologists who subscribe to neo-Darwinism believe that the 
mechanism of the biological evolution involves random genetic mutations.  The late 
Stephen J. Gould regarded contingency to be the basic creative force of life.  In his view, 
contingency played a decisive role in the evolution.  He writes:  “. . . run the tape again, 
and the first step from prokaryotic to eukaryotic cell may take 12 billion years instead of 
two . . . .”35  
 
There have also been challenges to the exclusive emphasis on randomness that is central 
to standard quantum mechanics.  Einstein’s famous adage that “the Old One does not 
play dice” most succinctly summarizes this position.  David Bohm, a famous American 
physicist, is one of the most influential thinkers and scientists who advocate the view of 
reality as deterministic.36  Bohm first formulated his theory back in the early 1950.  
Initially, the theory was quite successful and was able to gain some support in the physics 
community.  However, as time passed, its influence waned and has only recently 
experienced some revival.37 
 
Bohm certainly accepts the most important contribution of the currently dominant theory 
of quantum mechanics—its mathematical formalism.  By contrast with the dominant 
theory, however, in Bohmian mechanics this formalism is more than just a convenient 
way of calculating and predicting outcomes of quantum experiments.  The phenomena 
that quantum equations formalize are, for Bohm, the actual properties of reality.   
Bohmian mechanics explains even the weirdest quantum phenomena—such as non-
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locality, superposition, and backward causality—in terms of causes and effects.  In 
Bohm’s theoretical perspective, for example, non-locality—a quantum phenomenon that 
involves speeds faster than the speed of light—is not merely a mathematical 
representation of some results of quantum experiments.  It is, for Bohm, a fundamental 
property of reality.  The famous wave function is not just a convenient formula for 
calculating outcomes of quantum experiments; in the Bohmian world it actually guides 
particles and determines their state. One can also see such causal deterministic approach, 
for example, in John Cramer’s transaction interpretation of quantum mechanics38 and in 
the work of Russian physicist Pavel Kurakin and his colleagues who proposed a 
“conversational,” or “dialogue model of quantum transitions.”39  According to John 
Cramer, the originator of the transaction interpretation of QT, the greatest 
 
weakness of QT . . . is not that it asserts an intrinsic randomness but that it 
supplies no insight into the nature or origin of this randomness. If “God 
plays dice,” as Einstein has declined to believe, one would at least like a 
glimpse of the gaming apparatus that is in use.40 
 
In the most recent one, the physicists Sheldon Goldstein, Detlef Dürr, and Nino 
Zhangi offer an interpretation of quantum mechanics that is, in Goldstein’s words, 
“precise, objective—and deterministic.”41 In their view, the observed randomness 
is merely apparent.  In another challenge, the data obtained in the study of neutron 
resonances have led a group of physicists at Oak Ridge Electron Linear 
Accelerator, headed by Dr. Paul Koehler, to question the applicability of random 
matrix theory to movements of neutrons and protons in the nucleus.  The data 
indicate that the particles in the nucleus are moving in a coordinated fashion, 
rather than randomly as suggested by random matrix theory.42  At the same time 
other physicists report observing quantum phenomena in macro events.  A group 
of Russian physicists, led by S. M. Korotaev, has observed the phenomenon of 
non-locality, usually associated with the quantum domain, in dissipative 
geomagnetic macro processes.43  
  
As the above shows, although physicists apply deterministic perspectives mostly to the 
so-called macro domain, there are quite a few physicists and philosophers of physics who 
interpret quantum phenomena in terms of deterministic laws.44  Determinists also 
challenge the contingency perspective on biological evolution. The famous biochemist 
Christian de Duve advocates a deterministic interpretation of the origin of life on Earth,45 
as does Herbert Morowitz in his well-known book Beginnings of Cellular Life.46  
 
However, does either of these views represent an objective representation of 
reality?  There are two main conditions that satisfy the requirement for 
objectivity.  In order to be considered objective, a view must be able to withstand 
the test of rational justification.  In other words, one should be able to show that 
the selection of such view does not depend on one’s subjective and arbitrary will 
but it on rationality and laws of reason, or logic, that humans share.  Empirical 
verification is another important condition of objectivity--that is, there should be 
facts of reality that confirm this view. 
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On close examination, both views of reality—one that sees reality as ontologically 
indeterminate and uncertain and the other that sees it as ontologically determinate 
or ordered--do not withstand both tests of objectivity. 
 
In his article Ulvi Yurtsever makes a strong argument that quantum mechanical 
probabilities may very well be truly genuine, that is, that they are algorithmically 
random, or incompressible.  However, he also emphasizes that “no algorithmically 
incompressible binary string can ever be constructed via a finitely-prescribed procedure 
(since, otherwise, such a procedure would present an obvious algorithm to compress the 
string thus obtained).”47  This observation recognizes that although truly algorithmically 
random strings may indeed exist, their existence cannot be logically demonstrated. 
 
Jean Bricmont’s analysis yields a result that simply dismisses the entire issue of 
the intrinsic nature of indeterminism vs. determinism as ultimately irrelevant.  
Bricmont raises a question whether there is a function--in a Platonic sense (that is, 
independent of our ignorance)--that determines a finite sequence of sets of 
numbers that never repeats itself in a unique way.  His answer is that the existence 
of such function is simply impossible to disprove because one can always find a 
function or even many functions that map “each set into the next one.”48  
Bricmont’s conclusion dismisses the whole issue of indeterminism and 
determinism as utterly irrelevant to science.  In his view, “there is no notion of 
determinism that would make the question [of determinism] scientifically relevant 
. . .  ontically it [determinism] is true but uninteresting [that is, impossible to 
disprove].”49   “I don’t know,” he adds, “how to formulate the issue of 
determinism so that the question becomes interesting.”50 
 
For Hans Primas, indeterminism and determinism refer strictly to ontic descriptions.  
Like Bricmont, he makes a very convincing argument against conflating, as is often done, 
determinism with predictability.  According to his argument, even quantum interactions 
that are notoriously unpredictable are “governed by strict statistical laws.”51  Primas 
follows the principle of scientific determinism as formulated by the French 
mathematician Jacque Hadamard.  According to this principle, “. . . in a well posed 
forward-deterministic dynamical system every initial state determines all future states 
uniquely.”52  However, in contrast to others that subscribe to similar definitions of 
determinism (for example, Laplace), Primas follows Hadamard in regarding the principle 
of determination as regulative, and not in some absolute sense; in other words, if in some 
cases this principle is not satisfied, “it can be enforced by choosing a larger state 
space.”53  According to Primas, such enforcement is perfectly compatible with 
mathematical probability theory because: 
 
Every mathematically formulated dynamics of statistically reproducible 
events can be extended to a description in terms of a one-parameter group 
of automorphisms on an enlarged mathematical structure which describes 
a fictitious hidden determinism.  Consequently, randomness in the sense of 
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mathematical probability theory is only a weak generalization of 
determinism.54   
 
In his best selling book A New Kind of Science Steven Wolfram also shows that 
randomness can evolve into order and vice versa.55  Adducing to the fractal 
geometrical patterns in nature, Paul Carr observes that many natural phenomena 
reveal “the complex interplay between randomness (symbolized by dice) and 
global determinism (which loads the dice).  The Neo-Darwinist approach to 
evolution, as Carr points out, also emphasizes interplay between random genetic 
mutations and the globally deterministic natural selection.56  Summarizing the 
evidence related to such diverse phenomena as turbulent flows and neurons, 
Tamas Viscek in his article that appeared in Nature stresses that: 
 
. . . in both these systems [turbulent flows and neurons] (and in many 
others), randomness and determinism are both relevant to the system’s 
overall behavior.  Such systems exist on the edge of chaos, they may 
exhibit almost regular behavior, but also can change dramatically and 
stochastically in time and/or space as a result of small changes in 
conditions.57 
 
In another piece, also published in Nature, Kees Wapenaar and Roel Snieder 
make a similar point, drawing on evidence from physics: 
 
Our view of the universe may have shifted from the deterministic to the 
random, but since the turn of the last century physics itself has provided a 
less simplistic view.  Fields generated by random sources can be used for 
imaging and for monitoring of systems such as Earth’s subsurface, or 
mechanical structures such as bridges.  Randomness is no longer at odds 
with determinism, it has instead become a new window on the 
deterministic response of the physical world.58 
 
As the physicist Joseph Ford succinctly put it,  “God plays dice with the universe.  
But they are loaded dice.”59 
 
It is not difficult to see similarities in the way that Bricmont, Primas, and others 
resolve the problem of indeterminism vs. determinism.  They see that by 
enlarging the state space one can always find a deterministic function for a sample 
or a set.  This solution resonates with the famous proof of consistency and 
completeness by the Austrian logician and mathematician Kurt Gödel.  As Gödel 
has shown, any deductive system can have true sentences whose truth is 
indemonstrable.  In order to demonstrate their truth, one should resort to meta-
mathematical procedures and construct a new and broader axiomatic structure that 
would be powerful enough to make such proof possible.  However, according to 
Gödel’s proof, even the new and enlarged structure will not be able to escape the 
same paradox as it will also allow other true but improvable sentences.60  In other 
words, any axiomatic system is indeterminate and determinate at the same time 
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depending on whether it includes or excludes statements that are not consistent 
with the foundational axiom. 
 
One can also glean the connection of this problem to epistemology—that is, the 
way we approach reality, rather than what this reality actually is--from another 
angle.  There is a great deal of empirical evidence suggesting that nature does not 
give preference to either randomness or determinism.  In fact, many natural 
phenomena point to a close relationship and complex interaction between random 
and deterministic processes.  Many processes in nature can be often classified as 
non-deterministic and deterministic at the same time.61  The Nobel laureate Ilya 
Prigogine noted a close relationship between random and deterministic processes 
in his book with a characteristic title Order out of Chaos.62  
There is much empirical evidence that shows that nature does not favor either 
indeterminism equilibrium (associated with equilibrium) or determinism 
(associated with disequilibrium).  For example, in his interpretation of the current 
state of the universe, the astrophysicist Manasse Mbonye conjectures that  “the 
universe is always in search of a dynamical equilibrium,” which suggests a n 
interplay between the states of equilibrium and disequilibrium.63  Although the 
currently dominant cosmological theory asserts that our universe originated in the 
state of original disequilibrium, or Big Bang, numerous critics of this theory point 
to its speculative nature and argue that since it is an extrapolation from the current 
conditions into the past, this theory is not justified and still lacks unambiguous 
empirical support.64 
 
The above discussion leads to the conclusion:  one cannot regard either 
determinism (disequilibrium) or indeterminism (equilibrium) as objective in the 
ontological sense.  In other words, neither determinism nor indeterminism reflects 
the ontological state of reality.  They appear only as particular aspects of this 
reality on the phenomenological level—that is, on the level of phenomena.  
Assumptions that they are real in some ontological sense are subjective and 
arbitrary.  As such, they cannot serve as a foundation for any theorizing about 
reality that claims to be objectivity. 
 
 
Equilibration and Production of Disequilibrium in Human Thought 
 
If determinism and non-determinism are but particular aspects of the underlying 
ontological reality and are merely its phenomenal manifestations, so must be their 
cognates, including equilibrium and disequilibrium.  Since equilibrium and 
disequilibrium are products of processes--equilibration and the production of 
disequilibrium—these processes also belong to the phenomenological, not 
ontological level of reality.  As such, they both have common underlying 
ontological source, or ontological reality.  Equilibration and the production of 
disequilibrium are integral aspects of this source and are both included in its 
frame.  Therefore, they must be related to each other as parts of this common 
frame. 
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As has been pointed out, reason and reasoning involves making logical 
inferences--that is, inferences made in accordance with the rules and norms of 
logic.  In other words, reasoning is the kind of operation that establishes 
connections between our mental constructs.  In this sense reason and reasoning 
represent a form of equilibration that balances various mental constructs with 
each other.  Since this operation establishes connection between mental 
constructs, it is about continuity.  Therefore, reason and reasoning as 
representations of this operation are also about continuity. 
 
Faith, as has also been pointed out, is not about logical connections.  It is not 
about establishing logical connections based on inferences between objects of 
faith and other mental objects.  Faith is not about continuity.  It is precisely about 
grasping objects that are not connected or derived from other mental constructs by 
using logical operations.  Objects of faith represent radical disruptions, 
discontinuity; they produce disequilibrium.  Faith, thus, relates to the capacity of 
our mind to produce disequilibrium.   
 
Just as we are fully justified to reformulate the problem of the relationship 
between faith as reason as a problem of the relationship between equilibration and 
the production of disequilibrium, we are also perfectly justified to invert the 
problem of equilibration and the production of disequilibrium into the problem of 
the relationship between faith and reason. 
 
We know that our mind can execute logical operations and is, therefore, capable 
of performing equilibration.  We also know that our mind can create radical 
novelty.  Therefore, our mind is also capable of producing disequilibrium.  Since 
our mind can perform equilibration and also produce disequilibrium, the two must 
be related to each other in the broad frame of what our mind can do.  Since both 
faith and reason, or equilibration and the production of disequilibrium, represent 
operations that are performed by the human mind, therefore they must be in some 
way related to each other.  
 
We are all familiar with logical operations.  These operations perform one 
function that appears to be vital to our thinking.  They establish connections 
between our mental constructs.  But why does our mind need to establish these 
connections? 
 
Our mental constructs are products of operations that produce them.  Like other 
operations and their products that we can observe in nature, mental operations 
have to be conserved.  Conservation is ubiquitous in our universe.  It is 
fundamental to its very existence. 
 
Our universe is all there is.  Nothing can come into our universe from outside, 
because there is no outside to our universe.  Nothing can disappear from our 
universe because there is nothing outside our universe into which something can 
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disappear.  Everything, therefore, must be conserved.  Thus conservation is 
fundamental to and, therefore, ubiquitous in our universe and everything that 
exists in it, including the human mind.  Thus conservation is fundamental to the 
activity of human mind. 
 
All systems, including the human mind, have functional operations--that is, they do 
something.  The capacity to do what they do defines systems and is their most important 
property.  Systems are what they do—that is, the kind of operations that they do.  
Therefore, conservation is about conserving the functional operations of a system.   
 
Functional operations are forms of action; and the only way to conserve action is by 
acting it out.  Therefore, the more functional operations are used, the better they, and the 
system they constitute, are conserved.  Evolution favors systems that exercise their 
functions as much as possible since such systems conserve themselves better; they are 
selected for fitness and, therefore, survive. 
  
In order to do what they do, systems require resources.  Resources are critical for 
conservation.  Since resources are always finite, systems must be frugal and use their 
resources efficiently.  The more efficiently a system uses resources available to it, the 
more it stays active and the better it is conserved.  Evolution favors those systems that 
use their resources very efficiently. 
  
However, no matter how frugal a system is, no matter how efficiently it uses its 
resources, these resources are still limited.  While efficiency and frugality help and are 
rewarded by nature, they do not solve the fundamental problem of the finitude of 
resources.  The only way to solve this problem is by accessing new resources.  Since it is 
the only way to solve this problem, evolution must favor systems that are capable of 
gaining access to new resources. 
  
In order to gain access to new resources, a system must expand its range of 
possibilities—new ways and capacities to act—which requires new properties—new 
ways of acting--that are different from those that the system possesses.  In other words, 
expanding the range of possibilities requires the inclusion of something that the system is 
not, or differences.  The inclusion of differences enriches the system and makes it more 
powerful.  Thus conservation requires changes that make a system more powerful.  In 
order to conserve itself, a system must evolve.  Conservation is the engine of 
evolution.  A system that does not evolve cannot conserve itself and begins to 
disintegrate.65 
 
All systems have a mechanism that regulates their functional operations.  Since this 
mechanism regulates all functional operations, it represents a global operation.  As such, 
it has more power—that is, its range of possibilities is wider—than each individual local 
operation or their sum total.  Its power represents a multiplication, not a sum total, of all 
possibilities of all functional operations of the system.  In other words, its range of 
possibilities exceeds all possibilities of all functional operations in the system, which 
means that the regulatory mechanism is capable of recognizing what the system is not.  It 
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has the power of recognizing and embracing its negation.  Its level of organization is 
more powerful than that of any other level of organization in the system and, in this 
sense, it transcends the system.  Due to its power, the mechanism of regulation plays a 
critical role in systems.  It regulates functional operations and their interactions.  It also 
controls all interactions between the system and its environment. 
 
As has been indicated, regulation is a global function.  Its primary role is to conserve the 
entire system, which includes the mechanism of regulation.  In other words, regulation 
also needs to be conserved.  If regulation is not conserved, the entire system will start 
disintegrating.  The principle in conserving regulation is the same as conserving any other 
operation:  it has to be active.  The more regulation is activated, the better it is 
conserved.  The most proximate source of activation is local functional operations of the 
system.  Thus, conservation of the regulatory mechanism requires multiple connections 
between this mechanism and local functional operations.  Such integration involves both 
assimilation and adaptation. 
  
Since the global level of organization at which regulation operates is the most powerful 
level in the entire system, regulation can assimilate local functional operations and 
include them into its operational schemes.  This process leads to the differentiation of 
regulation.  Once local functional operations are included, they have to adapt to the 
powerful global mechanism.  Such adaptation requires making global operations 
accessible to local ones, which means that the less powerful operations must 
“understand” more powerful ones.  The translation of operations of greater power into the 
terms of operations of lesser power involves the emergence of a new frame that has 
sufficient power to include both the local and the global level as its particular cases.  The 
emergence of this new frame marks the beginning of a new cycle in the evolution of the 
system. The adaptation of local operations to the global level enriches and changes them.  
As a result of change, they require re-equilibration with each other.  This re-equilibration 
produces a new mechanism of regulation and the evolution of the system as a whole.   
 
Using its own functional operations is not the only way systems can conserve themselves.  
Environment, including other systems, offers a large array of differences that can be used 
to enrich and conserve a system.  Since the regulatory mechanism is more powerful than 
all the local functional operations that constitute a system, it has the capacity to transcend 
the boundaries of the system.  It can sense excitations in the environment of the system, 
including excitations created by other systems, not just those that originate within the 
system.  The regulatory mechanism can also use these external excitations for its 
conservation. 
  
Thus, regulation allows establishing connections between the system and its environment, 
including other systems.  The result of such structural coupling—the term used by 
neurobiologists Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela66—of regulatory 
mechanisms of different systems is coordination of regulatory operations of different 
systems and the eventual emergence of a common regulatory mechanism and a new 
structural whole in which each constituent part becomes a subsystem.  Such new 
integrated functional totality offers more possibilities and, consequently, offers access to 
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a greater array of resources.  The common regulatory mechanism activates subsystems 
more often, which also helps to conserve them. 
  
No matter which path the system takes—internal, external, or a combination of the two—
the outcome is the same:  the emergence of new and more powerful levels of organization 
with a more extensive array of possibilities.  The wider array of possibilities allows 
access to new resources and greater stability.  As a result, the system is better conserved; 
and whatever is conserved better is “selected for fitness.”  Thus, conservation requires 
creation of new and increasingly more powerful levels of organization.  The emergence 
of new and increasingly more powerful levels of organization constitutes evolution. 
 
Here is a schematic representation of how creation of new and more powerful levels of 
organization works: 
 
1)      
                [  A  ]                         [  B  ] 
               /         \                        /        \ 
          (a)         (not-a)           (b)         (not-b) 
 
 
 
  2)                     
                 [                AB                ] 
                                        /        |                   |            \ 
                                (a•b)    (not-a•b)    (a•not-b)    (not-a•not-b)   
 
Figure 1:  Schematic representation of the process of creation 
 
One can clearly see in Figure One that each operation on its own can perform only two 
kinds of action—it either acts or it does not.  Each operation has only two such 
possibilities; and the total for both of them is four. When combined with each other, each 
operation acquires four possibilities, for a total of eight for both.  Each possibility 
represents a distinct way of acting.  Each possibility expands the range of what a system 
can do and therefore increases its power.  Greater power is a new property that did not 
exist prior to its emergence.  This is the essence of creation.  Thus conservation leads to 
combination and combination creates new properties.  Conservation leads to creation.  
There is no conservation without creation and evolution.  If a system does not evolve, it 
will start disintegrating because it will not be able to conserve its regulatory mechanism 
that holds the system together and sustains it. 
 
An example from early child development described by famous psychologist and 
cognitive scientist Jean Piaget in his book The Origin of Intelligence in Children is a 
good illustration of how systems evolve.67  For Piaget, the starting point in this 
development is reflexes that are triggered by nerve signals.  Neural functions regulate 
physiological functions (for example, muscle contraction).  Signals from neurons activate 
physiological functions and thus conserve them.  The more frequently this triggering 
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occurs, the more active and, consequently, more stable these physiological functions are 
going to be.  Thus neural networks regulate physiological functions and conserve them.  
Combined together, neural and physiological functions constitute sensory-motor 
operations.  
 
Sensory-motor operations, or schemata in Piaget’s terminology, are also subject to the 
law of conservation.  They conserve themselves in two ways.  First, they become 
increasingly oriented toward external reality in search of stimulation.  This process 
evolves from casual encounters with stimuli to random groping in search of stimulation, 
and then to a more directed search for stimuli.  The directed search leads to the gradual 
construction of the object on the level of sensory–motor operations (although not yet on 
the representational level).  In other words, the child begins to simulate the presence of an 
object that the child has assimilated into sensory-motor operations in previous encounters 
(for example, simulating hand movements necessary for grasping an object).  As more 
objects are incorporated into sensory–motor schemata, the infant becomes increasingly 
more orientated toward the external environment.   
 
Sensory–motor operations (for example, tactile, audio, visual, gustatory, and other 
functions) also conserve themselves through mutual assimilation; that is, by including 
each other into their assimilative schemata.  One example of such mutual assimilation is 
the activation of the audio function by the visual one, and vice versa.  Piaget discusses 
several such instances.   For example, he notes that at a certain age when the infant hears 
mother’s voice, the child begins to turn the head, searching for the familiar image.  
Mutual assimilation of sensory-motor operations results in the emergence of stable 
connections between them and common regulation.  As a result of the emergence of 
common regulation, each sensory-motor operation receives more stimulation and 
consequently is better preserved.  The common regulatory mechanism offers more 
possibilities for stimulation and, therefore, is more powerful than the level of each 
sensory-motor operation or their sum total; these operations become particular cases in 
this more powerful arrangement.  The adaptation of sensory-motor operations to this new 
totality completes the process.  This new and more powerful level of organization gives 
rise to permanent mental representations that are equivalents of sensory-motor operations 
on the level of neural organization. The process is completed at the beginning of the 
second year of life when infants begin to look for objects that are hidden from their direct 
view.  The search for a hidden object indicates that the object is present in the child’s 
mind even when it is not in front of him or her; it indicates that the infant has already 
constructed a permanent mental image of the object.   
 
The emergence of neural networks that give rise to mental images marks the beginning of 
a new cycle in child development. While these networks regulate and conserve sensory-
motor operations, they also require conservation.  Such conservation involves mutual 
assimilation of networks, creation of a common regulatory level of organization with 
subsequent assimilation into and adaptation to this new totality.  Regulation stabilizes 
these connections and open the path for the development of symbolic operations, or what 
we commonly call thinking. 
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The above discussion makes clear that equilibration and the production of disequilibrium 
are two vital operations performed by the human mind.  As equilibrium grows, so does 
disequilibrium.  Thus equilibration produces disequilibrium, and the presence of 
disequilibrium results in re-equilibration.  Equilibration and the production of 
disequilibrium complement each other and are closely interrelated.  Their close and 
complementary relationship plays a vital role in conserving the mental states and 
constructs by creating new and increasingly more powerful levels of mental organization.  
Without such constant creation we cannot conserve our mental states and cannot survive. 
 
The understanding of how equilibration and production of disequilibrium are related and 
complement each other in the creation of new and increasingly more powerful levels of 
mental organization renders the process of creation intelligible.  Once this process 
becomes intelligible, we can understand and control it.  Control is a regulatory function.  
In other words, we can regulate this process in a way that will make it run in the most 
efficient manner. 
 
 
Using the Process of Creation for Sustaining Human Civilization 
 
In order achieve such efficiency, we must make sure that our control over this process 
rests on the objective and non-arbitrary foundation, rather than subjective and arbitrary.  
In other words, we have to make sure that it can withstand the test of rational justification 
and empirical verification. 
 
First, one has to emphasize that the process of creation is not an arbitrary concept created 
by our subjective mind.  It can withstand the test of rational justification and empirical 
verification.   
 
Humans observe reality.  This observation is not direct; it is mediated by our mental 
constructs.  Our senses transmit electrical signals into our brain that interprets these 
signals using its mental constructs.  Mental constructs play a critical role in observing 
reality.  Without them, we would not be able to observe anything.   
 
However, mental constructs are not innate.  As Piaget has shown, we create them—that 
is, we use the process of creation to create our mental constructs.  Without creating them, 
we would not be able to observe anything in our environment.  The world as it exists for 
us would be impossible without us creating mental constructs and observing reality.  
Therefore, without the process of creation the world would not exist for us.  The world 
that is so familiar to us simply would be logically impossible; it would simply not exist.  
This is the rational justification for the existence of the process of creation:  without the 
process of creation reality as it exists for us would simply not exist. 
 
The universe in which we live is full of objects that are results/products of the process of 
creation.  The products of creation are all around us:  minute sub-atomic particle and 
atoms, molecules, nebulas, stars, planets, galaxies, life, organisms, and much else.  
Humans are also products of this process that drives the evolution.  As products of the 
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process of creation, we inherit its properties.  We can create. Objects we make, houses we 
build, plants we grow, books, poetry, art, science, technology, our social organization, 
and our civilization as a whole—all of these are our creations.  They constitute empirical 
evidence for the existence of our capacity to create.  They provide empirical verification 
for the existence of the process of creation. 
 
However, the recognition that the process exists and is real does not yet guarantee that 
what we say about this process is objective.  The objective representation requires that we 
view the process of creation from the objective position that does not depend on our 
subjective choice.  If this condition is not observed, we can still end up with a subjective 
view of an objective process.  
 
Objective and universal knowledge should incorporate the activity of knowing, that is, 
the process by which knowledge has been created.  It should include the observer/knower 
into the field of observation.  Observing the process of creation requires identifying an 
objective position from which this process can be observed.  But how can one identify 
such objective position?  The very act of identification is a human act and a result of 
human choices; these choices inevitably involve subjectivity.  Is it possible to make such 
identification without getting into an infinite reflective regression, as Luhmann has 
argued?68  On also can put the question this way:  can one reflect on the process of 
creation from within the process of creation without placing one’s point of view outside 
this process? 
 
Our current dominant epistemological approach offers no satisfactory and conclusive 
answers to these questions.  It is aware of the problem of self-referentiality of knowledge 
and of the fact that observation is a function of the observer.69   However, it provides no 
definitive solution to this problem.  Luhmann, arguably the most insightful and nuanced 
theorist who has addressed this issue, fully understands, for example, that the circularity 
and self-reflectivity of observing is unavoidable and proposes to introduce what he calls 
“conditioning” to interrupt this circularity.  Such conditioning, according to Luhmann, is 
a proper function of reason, or rather reasons, as he puts it.  He is perfectly aware that 
rationality is not a panacea.  In his words, rational conditioning merely transforms “the 
vicious circle into an infinite regress” since “one must ask for the reasons behind the 
reasons.”70  However, for Luhmann this infinite regress “is fitted with hopes of 
approximating ever more closely to reality, which are finally anchored in functioning 
complexity.”71  In Luhmann’s view, awareness of circularity of reason is the key to a 
normative practice for observing reality: 
 
If one in turn justifies the reasons and keeps every step of this process 
open to critique and ready for revision, it becomes more improbably that 
such an edifice could have been constructed without reference to reality.  
The circularity is not eliminated.  It is used, unfolded, de-tautologized.  
Without this fundamental self-reference all knowledge would collapse.72 
 
Luhmann’s answer to the paradox of observing is not, as Loet Leydesdorff complains,73 
in the absolutism of a super-observer.  Rather, it is a cautious reminder that “questions of 
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final justification can only be answered within the self-referential theories of self-
referential systems” and in “the logic of universalistic theories that forces them [theories] 
to test on themselves everything they determine about their object.”74  The direction for 
resolving the paradox of observing pointed by Luhmann reveals modern sensitivity 
toward reflexivity, self-referentiality, recursivity and complexity.  Yet it ultimately, too, 
is not a solution since Luhmann does not define the position from which one may be able 
to observe the object and the process of observing, and yet be simultaneously embedded, 
as it is, in this process. 
 
The solution lies in understanding the process of creation.  It is logically correct to view 
the process of creation as a system.  Since it is a system, this process also relies on 
regulation in order to sustain itself.  Regulation is essentially a reflective operation.  The 
view of the process of creation as infinite may suggest, as it does to Luhmann, that there 
is really no way to reflect on this process since for every reflective position there will 
always be a possibility of constructing another one.  Every point of reflection can and 
will be succeeded by another one, no less embedded in the process of observing than its 
predecessor.  Should one conclude, then, that the problem of the embedded observer 
cannot be resolved and all that is left is to rely on palliatives, such as Luhmann’s 
conditioning? 
 
Just like any other system, the process of construction requires stabilization and, 
therefore, regulation that offers a possibility of reflection.  If the process of construction 
requires regulation, there must exist a position from which one should be able to reflect 
on the entire process while at the same time remaining deeply embedded in this process. 
As has been repeatedly pointed out, conservation and regulation are at the heart of the 
process of creation.  Conservation of functional operations requires regulation.  In the 
initial stages of their development the regulatory mechanism is unstable.  In order to 
acquire stability, it needs a regulatory mechanism of its own.  As the new mechanism 
stabilizes itself, the process enters a new cycle.  Thus the process of creation involves 
constant oscillation between equilibrium and disequilibrium, between equilibrating the 
current level and constructing a new (regulatory) level of organization, thus producing 
disequilibrium.  Both equilibrium and disequilibrium are dynamically related in the 
evolution of the process of creation.  As equilibrium grows in the course of equilibration, 
so does disequilibrium that equilibration produces.  The repetition of the cycle of 
equilibration and production of disequilibrium eventually leads to the improvement of the 
function of regulation and the process becomes increasingly more stable, despite constant 
changes.  One can probably best describe this dynamic stability as homeorhesis, rather 
than homeostasis.  Biologist Conrad Waddington has introduced this term to convey the 
capacity of maintaining the path of the evolution rather than a static condition.  
Homeorhesis implies the existence of a stable balance between equilibrium and 
disequilibrium.  This dynamic balance has a function of regulation and, as a regulatory 
operation, offers a possibility of reflecting on the functioning of the process of 
construction/creation as a whole.  It allows one to reflect on the process from the position 
of this dynamic balance that is inherent to the process; that is, in full awareness of both 
equilibration and the disequilibrium that it generates.  Any mental construct (theory, idea, 
etc.) can and should be viewed with full awareness of the fact that it ultimately is a stage 
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in the transition to new and more powerful levels of organization and that our task is to 
facilitate this transition and make it efficient.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This essay has set out to prove a possibility of reconciling faith and reason.  In contrast to 
most contributions that approach faith and reason cultural phenomena, this essay uses the 
approach that focuses on reason and faith as cognitive operations performed by the 
human brain.  In pursuing this approach, the essay has first transformed the problem of 
the relationship between faith and reason into the problem of the relationship between 
equilibration and the production of disequilibrium—two important operations that are 
performed by the human brain.  The establishment of equivalence between reason and 
faith, on one hand, and equilibration and production of disequilibrium, on the other, 
permits further transformation of the original problem into the problem of determinism 
and non-determinism. 
 
In addressing the relationship between determinism and non-determinism, this essay has 
reviewed the current perspectives on reality as either deterministic or non-deterministic.  
The analysis of these perspectives has led to the conclusion that both determinism and 
non-determinism are not relevant to ontological reality.  One cannot consider either 
determinism or non-determinism as ontologically primary.  Both belong to the 
phenomenal sphere—that is, they appear as phenomenal manifestations of the underlying 
ontological reality.  They are both products of the process of creation that constitutes this 
reality.  Since they are manifestations of the common ontological reality, they are not 
ontologically opposed to each other, rather they are intimately related and complementary 
phenomena generated by the common and ontologically primary process of creation. 
 
The demonstration that the two phenomenological binaries--determinism and non-
determinism—are interrelated and complementary to each other allows to extend this 
demonstration to other binaries cognate with determinism and non-determinism—
namely, equilibration and the production of disequilibrium, as well as faith and reason as 
cognitive operations associated with equilibration and production of disequilibrium. 
 
Thus, this essay has demonstrated that faith and reason are part of the phenomenal 
sphere.  Neither of them can claim ontological primacy over the other.  Also, they do not 
represent two separate and largely independent magisteria, as Stephen Gould among 
many others has argued.  They are two phenomena closely related and complementary to 
each other in the frame of the process of creation that gives rise to both of them.  As two 
intimately related and complementary phenomena, faith and reason are integral parts of 
our common human heritage.  The recognition of their commonality will allow us to use 
and combine the important achievements made in the domain of faith and in the domain 
of reason. 
 
The emphasis on creation as the fundamental property of reality will certainly enrich the 
domain of reason and add to its power. The domain of reason will also undoubtedly 
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benefit from the intuition articulated in the domain of faith about the fundamental unity 
of all that exists and the intimate relationship between truth/knowledge, justice/morality, 
and beauty/pleasure.  At the same time, the domain of faith will certainly benefit from the 
recognition of the infinite power of human reason to render all of reality, including the 
process of creation, intelligible and accessible to rational analysis. 
 
Such mutual enrichment will benefit humanity as a whole.  The mutual cooperative and 
complementary relationship between the two domains will undoubtedly help our 
civilization to solve many problems it faces today—problems that are associated with 
deep divisions produced by the opposition between reason and faith.  This process of 
rapprochement between faith and reason has already started.  We see it in the appearance 
of new theoretical approaches, such as systems theory that sees complex interactions 
between both the local and the global level of organization and that uses a holistic as well 
as atomistic approach; theory of emergence that essentially focuses on the rise of 
discontinuity, or what religion identifies as miracles; and theory of complexity that tries 
to understand the process of evolution of complex system, or the process of creation of 
new and increasingly more powerful levels of organization.  We also see this 
rapprochement in the emphasis on reason and analysis, and the acceptance of science as 
integral to our understanding of reality in the works and pronouncements of church 
dignitaries, including Pope John Paul II and Pope Benedict XVI. 
 
The growing cooperation between the domain of faith and the domain of religion will 
allow us to understand and control the process of creation.  As a result, we will be able to 
utilize the process of creation more effectively and efficiently.  By controlling the process 
of creation, by using it more efficiently in creating new and increasingly more powerful 
levels of organization, we will be able to conserve, rather than destroy, our civilization 
and thus sustain it into an indefinite future. 
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